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Abstract 
This paper identifies two alternative forms of prudential regulation. The first set is 
formed by regulations that directly control financial aggregates, such as liquidity 
expansion and credit growth. An example is capital requirements as currently 
incorporated in internationally accepted standards, namely, capital requirements with 
risk categories used in industrial countries. The second set, which can be identified 
as the "pricing-risk-right" approach, works by providing incentives to financial 
institutions to avoid excessive risk-taking activities. A key feature of this set of 
regulations is that they encourage financial institutions to internalize the costs 
associated with the particular risks of the environment where they operate. 
Regulations in this category include ex-ante risk-based provisioning rules and capital 
requirements that take into account the risk features particular to developing 
countries. This category also includes incentives for enhancing market discipline as a 
way to differentiate risk-taking behavior between financial institutions 
The main finding of the paper is that the first set of regulations—the most commonly 
used in developing economies—have had very limited usefulness in helping countries 
to contain the risks involved with more liberalized financial systems. The main reason 
for this disappointing result is that, by not taking into account the particular 
characteristics of financial markets in developing countries, these regulations cannot 
effectively control excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. Moreover, the paper 
shows that, contrary to policy intentions, this set of prudential regulations can 
exacerbate rather than decrease financial sector fragility, especially in episodes of 
sudden reversal of capital flows. 
In contrast, the second set of prudential regulations can go a long way in helping 
developing countries achieve their goals. The paper advances suggestions for how to 
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  After more than a decade of financial sector liberalization, both of domestic markets and 
of international financial transactions (capital account liberalization), policymakers in many 
developing countries remain concerned about the effects that large and highly volatile capital 
flows have on their financial systems. This is not surprising given the increasing evidence that, in 
sharp contrast to policy objectives, financial crises have become more frequent following 
financial liberalization. However, in spite of the tremendous costs associated with the resolution 
of crises and signs of discontent among the population with the outcome of some reforms, to date 
there is no significant evidence indicating a reversal of the reform process. With few exceptions 
(mostly of temporary nature) developing countries have not gone back to the era of highly 
controlled domestic financial markets or closed capital accounts. While one could advance a 
number of hypotheses explaining this “commitment to reforms”, developing countries’ decisions 
and actions seem to indicate that policymakers perceive capital inflows as a necessary 
component to achieve growth and development. Rather than severely restricting the movement 
of capital, many countries have intensified their attempts to strengthen their domestic economies, 
and especially their financial systems. The hope is that if only the right policies could be 
designed to insulate domestic financial sectors from the volatility of international capital flows, 
countries could enjoy the benefits of both additional foreign capital for growth and stable 
domestic financial systems.     
 
  In this regard, policy recommendations for dealing with the domestic financial market 
problems generated by highly volatile capital flows have not been in short supply, and many of 
these recommendations have indeed been applied in a wide range of developing countries.  
While the policy menu is quite ample, analysts’ emphasis on one set of recommendations rather 
than another greatly depends on what they view as the major cause of the problem. For those that 
believe that capital flow volatility is largely the result of a faulty international financial 
architecture that does not sufficiently take into account market imperfections and information 
asymmetries at the international level, appropriate policies include further official intervention, 
such as additional controls on the activities of the international capital markets, including 
regulation of hedge funds. For this group of analysts, capital controls are a desirable policy 
response by developing countries. 
 
 To others, the major cause of capital flow volatility experienced by developing countries 
resides in the domestic macroeconomic policies of the recipient countries. To this group, policy 
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recommendations stress the avoidance of fiscal, monetary and external imbalances and the 
maintenance of a sustainable debt path.  Yet, there is third group of analysts that view domestic 
financial weaknesses as the key cause of major disruptions derived from capital flow volatility. 
Since a large proportion of capital inflows are intermediated through domestic financial markets, 
and especially banks in developing countries, the central policy prescription for this group of 
analysts lies in strengthening domestic financial institutions through improved regulation and 
supervision. An additional policy recommendation deals with increasing the maturity of financial 
assets by encouraging the development of domestic capital markets. 
 
Emphasis on one set of policy prescriptions does not mean, of course, total disregard of 
the others. Indeed, most analysts would agree that the disruptive effects of capital flow volatility 
on developing countries is the result of a combination of most of the factors mentioned above. 
For example, those that emphasize improvements in the regulatory and supervisory framework 
of developing countries, also recognize that these policy tools can only be effective in a stable 
macroeconomic environment, and some analysts in this group would also support certain forms 
of capital controls. 
 
  In this connection, this paper focuses on a particular aspect of the problem at hand and 
asks how appropriate prudential financial regulation should be designed to contain the risks 
resulting from liberalized financial systems facing high external capital volatility.  The view 
taken here is that in order to provide advice to developing countries on how to improve 
regulation and supervision of financial markets, it is first necessary to answer two questions. The 
first is whether commonly used regulatory tools have been effective in reducing the adverse 
effects of capital flow volatility on domestic financial markets. The second is whether 
appropriate regulatory and supervisory tools in developing countries need to be different from 
those that work in industrial countries and even differ between developing countries at different 
degrees of financial sector development. 
 
To conduct this task, the paper identifies two alternative forms of prudential regulation. 
The first set is formed by regulations that directly control financial aggregates, such as liquidity 
expansion and credit growth. An example is capital requirements as currently incorporated in 
internationally accepted standards; namely capital requirements with risk categories used in 
industrial countries. The second set, which can be identified as the “pricing-risk-right” approach, 
works by providing incentives to financial institutions to avoid excessive risk-taking activities. A 
key feature of this set of regulations is that they encourage financial institutions to internalize the 
costs associated with the particular risks of the environment where they operate. Regulations in 
this category include ex-ante risk-based provisioning rules and capital requirements that take into 
account the risk features particular to developing countries.  This category also includes 
incentives for enhancing market discipline as a way to differentiate risk-taking behavior between 
financial institutions. 
 
The main finding of the paper is that the first set of regulations—the most commonly 
used in developing economies-- have had very limited usefulness in helping countries to contain 
the risks involved with more liberalized financial systems. The main reason for this 
disappointing result is that, by not taking into account the particular characteristics of financial 
markets in developing countries, these regulations cannot effectively control excessive risk   4
taking by financial institutions. Moreover, the paper shows that, contrary to policy intentions, 
this set of prudential regulations can exacerbate rather than decrease financial sector fragility, 
especially in episodes of sudden reversal of capital flows. 
 
In contrast, the paper claims, the second set of prudential regulation can go a long way in 
helping developing countries achieving their goals. The paper advances suggestions for the 
sequencing of implementation of these regulations for different groups of countries.  
 
   The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes features of domestic 
financial markets in developing countries that exacerbate the effects of international capital flow 
volatility on the domestic economies. Section III assesses the experience of developing countries 
with the most commonly used prudential regulatory and supervisory tools for coping with the 
volatility of capital flows and advances explanations for why these policies have been of very 
limited usefulness. Section IV advances specific policy recommendations for prudential 
regulatory policies that might have a good chance of working effectively in developing countries. 
In doing so, the section identifies and analyzes features of prudential regulation used in industrial 
countries that would need to be modified to be effective in developing countries. Section V 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
II. Features of Financial Markets in Developing Countries that Exacerbate the Adverse 
Effects of Capital Flow Volatility 
 
  Sudden stops of capital inflows are a most feared characteristic of capital account 
volatility in developing countries as they cause an abrupt and dramatic reduction in sources of 
funding for growth and development. A drastic decrease in net capital inflows will bring about 
pressures on a number of financial variables. By reflecting a reduction in the overall demand for 
domestic assets, interest rates will increase and prices of assets--held either by locals or 
foreigners—will decrease. Pressures on the exchange rate and/or international reserves will also 
materialize.   
 
  The extent to which domestic financial systems in developing countries can manage the 
adverse impact of a sudden reversal of capital inflows is certainly influenced by the strength of 
the systems before the shock
2. For example, the damage to the value of banks’ assets as a result 
of a sudden increase in interest rates will be minimized if the quality of their loan portfolio is 
high. This would imply that the banks’ client base is able to generate liquidity to service its 
payments on a timely basis and that the ratio of non-performing loans to loans is low before the 
emergence of the shock. Likewise, the effect of a significant exchange rate depreciation on the 
quality of banks’ balance sheets would be minimized if bank managers had either arranged 
adequate hedges on net foreign-currency denominated bank liabilities or strictly limited these 
exposures in countries lacking liquid private sector markets to hedge foreign exchange 
positions.
34  The stronger the initial conditions of banks before the shock, the greater the 
                                                 
2 As discussed in the introduction, there are also a number of other factors that will determine the impact of the 
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confidence of depositors in the banks’ capacity to weather the shock and, therefore, the lower the 
probability that depositors will run the banks when adverse international financial conditions 
arise. 
 
Indeed, strong confidence in domestic financial systems is usually reflected in a: (a) high 
degree of financial intermediation; (b) stable deposit base and (c) dynamic financial system that 
intermediates funds to the private sector on a sound basis. 
 
These features of financial sector strength were not typical characteristics of developing 
countries in the 1980s.  At the time, in most developing countries, depository institutions - banks 
and savings institutions issuing deposit-like liabilities – were the most important vehicles for 
institutional savings. However, with the exception of a few countries, in the 1980s deposit 
liabilities to the private sector of all banking institutions constituted a low percentage of GDP in 
developing countries relative to the corresponding ratio in major industrial countries. In other 
words, relatively few saving funds were held in financial intermediaries.  
 
Not only the banking sectors were relatively shallow, but also the liabilities and assets of 
these institutions were of short maturity: bank deposits financed short-term loans, short-term 
government paper and central bank securities. The combination of these two features reflected 
lack of depositors’ confidence in domestic financial systems and made these systems highly 
vulnerable to capital flow volatility. 
 
  Recognition of the need to strengthen domestic financial systems led to comprehensive 
reforms in a number of developing countries during the late 1980s and 1990s. By attempting to 
improve the quality of financial intermediaries’ portfolios, the policy objective was to improve 
investors’ confidence in the financial systems and, therefore, to increase the resilience of 
domestic financial systems to capital flow volatility. Moreover, it was also expected that stronger 
financial systems would contribute to lower the volatility of capital flows.   
 
While it is difficult to argue against the advantages of stronger financial systems as a tool 
to help mitigate the adverse impact of capital flow volatility, efficient and effective 
implementation of reforms requires careful consideration of the appropriate pace, timing and 
sequencing of these reforms.  After all, even in a number of industrial countries, financial 
liberalization occurred only in the 1970s and in some countries like Norway in the early 1980s. 
A reform implemented in countries with the lowest level of financial development would most 
likely have a different effect than in counties with more developed financial systems.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
to firms and individuals with revenues denominated in domestic currency. As will be discussed below, incentives for 
banks to adequately avoid excessive foreign-exchange risk taking depends on the announced government policies. 
4 The importance for banks to limit their net foreign-currency liabilities cannot be overstressed. In most developing 
countries, forward markets for foreign exchange are lacking. Moreover, in the few cases where these markets exist, 
they do not have sufficient depth and liquidity as to provide adequate hedge in times of high exchange rate volatility. 
For example, in late 1998 in Brazil, when expectations about exchange rate depreciation mounted, the only source of 
hedge came from the government who placed a large number of U.S. dollar-denominated government securities in 
banks’ balance sheets. While this action insulated the banking system from the sharp devaluation in early 1999, it 
also transferred the exchange rate risk (and the associated fiscal costs) from the private sector to the government.   6
The issue of reform-readiness, however, was not sufficiently taken into account in 
developing countries. Indeed, one can identify “clusters” of reforms over the last two decades 
that have been implemented in countries with very different degrees of development. The first 
“cluster” included both liberalization of interest rates and dismantling of credit controls. These 
reforms proved to be destabilizing in the absence of appropriate supervision
5.   Indeed, this “first 
round” of reforms created incentives for increased risk-taking by banks. Competition for market 
share without appropriate “rules of the game” determining not only “entry” requirements into the 
banking systems, but also provisions for  “exit” out of the system resulted in dramatic increases 
in the risk features of banks’ portfolios that were fully exposed following the eruption of adverse 
shocks. The second “cluster”, therefore, focused on improving the regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks—including advances in the implementation of the recommendations of the Basel 
Committee
6. Once again, however, these improvements were not sufficient to prevent the 
eruption of large financial crises that followed the reversal of capital inflows that started in the 
late 1990s and continued through 2002. Reasons for the less-than-satisfactory results of these 
reforms efforts will be discussed in the next sections.    
 
While, generally speaking, developing countries around the world have followed similar 
“clusters” of reforms, not all regions, or countries within a region, have implemented reforms at 
the same time or with the same intensity. Chart 1 reproduces Abiat and Mody’s (2003) index of 
financial liberalization by region.
7  The most important result is that, in spite of partial reversal in 
some regions at some times, there is a clear trend towards increased financial liberalization. 
Among regions of the developing world, East Asia has the most liberalized financial systems and 
South Asia has the least liberalized systems. An interesting finding is that because of continuous 
progress in liberalization by OECD countries, the “financial liberalization gap” between 
developing and industrial countries has not decreased significantly over time, with the exception 
of Latin America from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990’s, when the region undertook massive 
reforms and consequently reduced the financial liberalization gap with industrial countries.  
 
                                                 
5 See, Diaz Alejandro (1985) for a recount of how financial liberalization without appropriate supervision resulted in 
severe financial crises in Latin America in the early 1980s. 
6 In a recent database constructed by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001), only 17 countries out of 110 surveyed 
responded that their minimum required capital-to-asset ratio did not conform to the Basel’s guidelines. 
7 The index is formed by six components: (a) credit controls; (b) interest rate controls; (c) entry barriers, including 
limits on the participation of foreign banks; (d) privatization of the financial sector and (e) restrictions on 
international financial transactions. The higher the value of the index, the higher the degree of financial 
liberalization. See Abiat and Mody (2003) for a detailed methodology.   7
 
 
    In addition to financial liberalization and improvements in regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks, developing countries have made significant efforts to attract foreign capital into 
their financial systems. In many cases, this was the result of deep banking crises that required 
huge injections of capital in order to restore financial solvency. In other cases, the increased 
participation of foreign banks in developing countries was the result of a combination of lower 
yields on investments in industrial countries and the expectations of higher yields on investments 
in developing countries as  
a result of the impetus from the structural reforms of the 1990s.
8 The trend toward 
internationalization of banking systems have been particularly notorious in Latin America, where 
in some countries, such as Mexico, the effective foreign control in banking systems (measured as 
the ratio of loans to total loans in the banking system provided by banks that have at least 40 
percent foreign ownership in local institutions) reached more than 70% in 2002. This compares 
with a percentage of just over 10 percent in 1996 (see Chart 2).  
 
                                                 
8 For an analysis of the role of foreign banks in Latin America, see Latin American Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee (2002). 
 















































Source: Abiad and M ody (2003)  8
After two decades of reforms, have the main weaknesses that characterized developing 
countries financial markets in the early 1980s improved? Has the depth of financial 
intermediation increased during the late 1990s and early 2000s? Are there signals that investors’ 
confidence in the strength of domestic financial systems has improved? An analysis of the data 
provides a mixed response. Consider first, the degree of financial deepening. Table 1 shows that 
for most countries (with countries in East Asia as an important exception) the depth of financial 
intermediation, measured by the ratio of deposits to GDP, has remained below 30 percent
9. This 
contrasts with industrial countries where the ratio is above 50 percent in most cases.  
 
 
The relative shallowness of financial systems in developing countries suggests that 
investors’ confidence that financial assets will yield a positive and stable rate of return over an 
extended period of time has remained weak. Investors’ concerns are reflected in the high degree 
of volatility in the ratio of deposits to GDP that persisted in developing countries during the 
1990s. This is shown in the last two columns of Table 1 that presents the coefficient of variation 
during the 1980s and the 1990s-early 2000s. Most developing countries not only displayed a 
much higher degree of volatility of deposits to GDP than did industrial countries, but volatility 
actually increased from the first to the second period in a number of developing countries. 
 
The persistence of investors’ concerns finds justification in Table 2, which presents real 
interest rates on deposits in selected industrial and developing countries over the last two 
decades. In contrast to the industrial countries, where real interest rates have remained mostly 
positive, at low levels, and quite stable (as measured by the values of the standard deviation), in 
developing countries real interest rates remained either negative for substantial periods of time or 
skyrocketed to unsustainably high levels. Times of extremely high real interest rates by no means 
indicated high levels of productivity. Instead, they reflected the elevated risk of liabilities issued 
by domestic borrowers as investors perceived a high probability of significant losses in the real 
value of their assets either through inflation, devaluation, controls or outright default. With the 
                                                 
9 In some cases, most notably Venezuela, this ratio has declined significantly. 
Chart 2. Main Latin Ameican Banking Systems:
Foreign Effective Control 1996-2002 
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Source: Salomon Smith Barney: Foreign Financial Institutions in Latin America (2002)  9
exception of East Asian countries, interest rate volatility in developing countries has been much 
higher than in industrial countries and, in many countries, has even increased during the 1990s-
early 2000s relatively to the 1980s.   
 
 
Country 1980-89 1990-2003* 2003* 1980-89 1990-2003*
Australia 38.13 59.11 69.01 0.11 0.10
Canada 64.28 73.93 75.25 0.04 0.03
France 64.72 62.99 70.77 0.03 0.08
Norway 47.95 51.84 53.35 0.10 0.06
Sweden 48.91 39.65 37.39 0.05 0.04
United States 61.02 56.84 60.37 0.04 0.07
Gabon 15.06 12.31 13.12 0.13 0.15
Ghana 7.20 13.58 16.82 0.25 0.19
Niger 10.61 8.28 6.99 0.23 0.39
Nigeria 20.48 15.03 21.38 0.18 0.25
South Africa 51.21 48.20 61.48 0.03 0.31
Uganda 5.74 9.15 14.75 0.32 0.38
Turkey 24.99 35.56 41.16 0.05 0.32
Indonesia 17.91 45.93 49.80 0.31 0.16
Korea 32.10 51.31 78.92 0.08 0.35
Malaysia 90.63 105.57 123.44 0.29 0.23
Thailand 51.57 91.18 102.12 0.22 0.17
Argentina 18.74 18.77 23.05 0.21 0.35
Brazil 29.05 34.30 27.23 0.45 0.45
Chile 27.49 35.63 35.61 0.09 0.09
Colombia 26.29 27.21 26.60 0.06 0.13
Mexico 22.33 25.87 24.97 0.31 0.14
Peru 17.47 21.06 25.42 0.17 0.25
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 50.10 24.23 14.08 0.18 0.39
Bulgaria n.a. 40.34 31.41 n.a. 0.58
Kazakhstan n.a. 10.14 15.34 n.a. 0.51
Poland 37.90 31.29 37.25 0.24 0.15
Romania 25.48 25.09 21.36 0.10 0.42
Russia n.a. 16.07 20.95 n.a. 0.15
Ukraine n.a. 15.54 23.24 n.a. 0.65
* Or latest available
Source: IMF Financial Statistics (September 2004)
Table 1. Bank Deposits to GDP in Selected Countries
Africa and Middle East
Latin America
Transition Economies
Coefficient of Variation Ratio
Industrial Countries
Asia
   10
 
1980-89 1990-2003* 2003* 1980-89 1990-2003*
Industrial Countries
Germany 2.58 2.29 1.28 0.76 1.40
Japan 0.69 0.53 0.30 1.32 0.74
Sweden 2.38 1.75 1.18 2.37 2.00
United Kingdom 3.16 1.96 1.07 3.34 1.48
United States 4.34 1.87 -1.12 1.97 1.50
Middle East
Algeria -5.23 -4.97 2.67 3.26 10.35
Egypt -6.67 2.10 3.98 4.31 4.99
Israel -15.99 2.34 5.93 56.71 3.79
Turkey -10.91 -1.13 12.38 34.19 10.91
Africa
Central African Rep. 3.79 2.30 1.87 7.46 8.08
Gabon 1.31 2.89 4.50 7.29 12.35
Malawi -5.92 6.23 25.43 7.60 16.16
Sierra Leone -50.28 -14.44 0.82 46.83 24.02
South Africa -1.89 4.23 3.90 5.35 2.72
South Asia
Bangladesh 4.22 3.62 2.16 1.94 3.10
Sri Lanka 3.03 1.07 -0.31 6.86 2.72
East Asia
Malaysia 3.34 2.62 2.01 2.93 1.09
Philippines -0.34 2.64 2.23 10.35 1.86
Singapore 3.04 1.21 0.00 1.73 1.27
Thailand 5.66 3.81 -0.48 5.82 2.34
Latin America
Argentina -40.30 -15.78 6.56 42.69 75.44
Chile 8.87 4.91 -0.08 12.41 3.76
Colombia 7.32 13.13 5.82 4.53 5.63
Ecuador -13.57 -0.59 3.26 16.10 28.64
Mexico -16.79 -0.18 -1.46 22.46 4.68
Venezuela -9.12 5.81 -2.59 13.85 22.61
Transition Countries
Bulgaria n.a. -118.01 0.74 n.a. 279.86
Czech Republic n.a. -0.90 1.23 n.a. 1.73
Poland -144.55 -36.86 2.99 261.04 137.46
Russia n.a. -24.42 -9.19 n.a. 35.00
* Or latest available
Source: IMF Financial Statistics (September 2004) and Bloomberg
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An indicator of financial strength that is rarely analyzed is the share of government 
claims in bank assets. This indicator, however, is quite important because, after all, one of the 
objectives of financial liberalization and reforms was to reduce the massive transfer of resources 
from the private financial sector to the public sector, which in the 1970s and early 1980s had 
served to finance large fiscal deficits. Yet, in a number of cases, the results have been 
disappointing.  While governments significantly reduced their interference in direct allocation of 
credit, a number of governments continued financing their deficits with resources from the 
domestic banking system. Whereas in the 1980s this was achieved by direct lending to 
governments or high reserve requirements, since the mid-1990s governments issued large 
amounts of debt that was purchased by banks and by the general public. Indeed, it is interesting 
to note that in addition to bank deposits, government paper constitutes the other major source of 
liquidity in developing countries. Absent liquid private capital markets, with some noteworthy 
exceptions including Chile and some Asian countries, investors in developing countries largely 
hold their financial wealth in bank deposits and government paper. As will be discussed in the 
next section, this development has had important consequences for the effectiveness of reserve 
requirements.  
 
Chart 3 illustrates the evolution of government paper held by domestic banking systems in 
developing countries.  The chart shows that the share of government paper in banks’ balance sheets 
increased from the 1980-94 period to the 1995-2003 period in many  
 
Chart 3. Claims on Government as a Percentage of Total Assets. 

























































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (September 2004)
* Or as recent as data permit  12
developing countries (many countries are located to the right of the 45 degree line). This result is a 
sad irony: a significant component of the efforts of financial sector reform undertaken in the early 
to mid-1990s aimed at decreasing the share of banks’ claims on government! It is important to 
note, of course, that the results in Chart 3 should not be entirely attributed to an inappropriate 
implementation of regulatory reform. In a number of countries, banking crises were resolved by 
replacing bad loans with government paper (Mexico and the post 1997- East Asian-crisis countries 
are examples of this). Given the lack of access of emerging markets to international capital markets 
during crisis periods, it is very difficult to conceive alternative procedures for banking crisis 
resolution. To take this into account, banking crisis periods were eliminated from the sample, 
including five years after the crisis. The basic result did not change: many banking systems in 




As Chart 3 shows, the ratio of claims on government as a percentage of deposits not only 
has increased for many countries, but is also very high. Large countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey display ratios above 30 percent. Among the sample of countries, 
those that can be identified as succeeding in reducing this ratio to a low level include Chile, 
Panama, Botswana, Malaysia and Thailand. 
 
These large and increasing stocks of government paper in the balance sheet of developing 
country financial systems have exacerbated the adverse effects of sudden stops of capital flows 
into the domestic economies, as demonstrated by the recent crisis experience in Argentina.  As 
sudden stops usually bring about a decline in the market value of government debt, banks’ asset 
value deteriorates. Thus, a significant deterioration in the credit risk perception of sovereigns by 
international investors may translate into severe problems in domestic banking systems.         
 
  In sum, financial systems characterized by a large predominance of short-term and highly 
volatile instruments are features of most developing countries that contribute to exacerbate the 
adverse effects of capital flow volatility on the stability of domestic systems. These features also 
constrain the effectiveness of policy instruments to deal with a sudden reversal of capital flows
11. 
The evidence suggests that the reforms undertaken since the 1980s have not been able to 
substantially improve the destabilizing features of financial systems in most developing 
countries. The next section will assess two of the most common prudential regulatory policies 
implemented to deal with capital flow volatility. 
 
 
                                                 
10 The case of Argentina is particularly telling. During the early 1990s, following the implementation of the currency 
board, banks decreased their relative holding of government paper. After the banking crisis of 1995, there was an 
increase in holdings of government paper that one can associate with the restructuring efforts of the financial sector, 
including improving the liquidity of the banks. However, for a long time after the crisis was completely resolved, 
banks continued to increase their claims on government. By the end of 2000 the share of bank claims on central and 
non-central government as a percentage of total assets reached 25 percent, a ratio close to the 27 percent observed in 
1991 at the beginning of the currency board. 
11 Consider, for example, that following a sudden reversal of capital inflows policy makers decide to increase the 
short-term policy rate in order to stabilize exchange rate movements. Because of the absence of a yield curve 
covering a large spectrum of maturities, the increase in the policy rate would bring about an increase in interest rates 
throughout the financial sector, imposing unwanted effects on the entire system.   13
III. Commonly Used Financial Regulatory Policies to Deal with the Adverse Effects of 
Capital Flow Volatility 
 
  While experience shows that recent reforms have not resulted in the desired increase in 
financial deepening in most developing countries, the question remains as to whether some forms 
of regulations may be more effective than others in dealing with the adverse effects of capital 
flow volatility on the, currently shallow, domestic financial markets.  
 
Prudential regulatory policies to deal with capital flow volatility can be divided into two 
groups.
12 The first consists of regulations aimed at directly controlling financial aggregates, such 
as liquidity expansion and credit growth. Their purpose is to limit the expansion of balance 
sheets following a period of large capital inflows to minimize the adverse effects on the financial 
system if a sudden reversal of the inflows were to materialize. The best-known examples are the 
use of reserve requirements and capital requirements as currently incorporated in international 
standards, namely capital requirements that contain risk categories used in industrial countries.
13  
Other policies in this category include the imposition of limits to the exposures of banks to real 
estate and equity and restrictions to the investment portfolios of domestic pension funds.  
 
The second group, which can be identified as the “pricing-risks-right” approach to 
regulation works by providing financial incentives to managers and owners of financial 
institutions to avoid excessive risk-taking activities. The main feature of this set of regulations is 
that they encourage financial institutions to internalize the costs associated with the particular 
risks of the environment where they operate. Policies in this group include ex-ante risk-based 
provisioning rules and capital requirements that are designed to take into account the particular 
risk features of developing countries. As will be discussed below, these risk features may differ 
significantly from those faced by financial institutions in industrial countries. This category also 
includes the enforcement of market discipline mechanisms to encourage holders of financial 
sector liabilities to discriminate among financial institutions according to risk. By inducing 
financial institutions to internalize the costs of holding high-risk assets, this regulatory approach 
also aims at minimizing the social cost of financial sector disturbances. 
 
Most efforts in developing countries have been concentrated on the first set of policies. 
This section will discuss and assess the effectiveness of two of the most common policy tools in 
this group, reserve or liquidity requirements and capital requirements as recommended by the 
Basel Committee, in controlling the adverse impact of volatile capital flows on the domestic 
financial systems. The next section will discuss whether the “pricing-risk-right” approach to 
prudential regulation can do a better job than more commonly used policies.  
 
 
A.  Can Reserve Requirements Play an Effective Prudential Role in Dealing with 
Capital Flow Volatility? 
 
                                                 
12 A similar, although not exactly equal, classification of regulation is discussed in Barth et al (2001). 
13 As will be discussed below, capital standards designed to appropriately reflect the risk-features of bank portfolios 
in developing countries would belong to the category of “incentives-based” regulations.   14
The use of reserve requirements in developing countries has evolved significantly over 
the last quarter of a century. As mentioned in Section II, high reserve requirements in the 1970s 
and 1980s were often used as a mechanism to finance fiscal deficits with banks’ resources.  
Indeed, an important component of the first “cluster” of reforms was to reduce reserve 
requirements as a complement to the elimination of governments’ credit controls.  During the 
mid 1990s, after the severe banking crises that followed the exchange rate crisis in Mexico, 
reserve requirements, and more generally “liquidity requirements” were given a new role: this 
instrument could be used as a “prudential” device to limit the intermediation of large amounts of 
capital inflows through weak banking systems.  An additional argument for high reserve 
requirements as a prudential regulatory tool is that they can act as a cushion to protect banks 
from sudden withdrawal of funds, especially in the context of a sudden reversal of capital 
inflows
14. By ensuring the availability of liquidity to meet unusually large withdrawals of 
deposits, reserve requirements may contribute to the stability of the banking system.
15 This role 
could be particularly effective if the resources derived from the requirements are placed abroad 
in foreign- currency denominated assets.  
 
This paper deals only with the role of reserve requirements in controlling the availability 
of liquid assets in the economy. It does not discuss the differentiation of reserve requirements on 
deposits denominated in domestic currency and deposits denominated in foreign currency. This 
distinction is fully analyzed in other papers in this volume dealing specifically with pros and 
cons of capital controls. 
 
  Enthusiasm for the use of reserve requirements as a prudential tool grew strong in a 
number of developing countries after the events in Argentina during the banking crisis that 
ensued in early 1995, following the Tequila crisis in Mexico. Before the crisis, during the period 
of large capital inflows (1991-94), the Argentinean authorities had imposed high reserve 
requirements. The funds generated by these requirements were invested in foreign-currency 
liquid assets, such as bank deposits in large banks in New York or US Treasury Bills, either by 
the Argentinean banks themselves or by the Central Bank. Following the uncertainties in 
international capital markets that resulted from the Tequila crisis, investors withdrew large 
amounts of deposits from Argentinean banks, especially from large banks owned by provinces 
and municipalities. Over 70 percent of the deposit loss was financed by a decline in liquid assets. 
The central bank accommodated the decline in assets by sharply reducing reserve requirements.
16 
Hence, it can be argued that high reserve requirements allowed a number of banks in Argentina 
to withstand large deposit withdrawals following an unexpected reversal of capital inflows.     
 
  What made reserve requirements serve their designed purpose in the Argentinean case? 
In addition to a well-managed system by the Central Bank, it is important to stress that a key 
reason for its success was that significant sources of liquidity in Argentina were limited to 
                                                 
14 For an analysis of the effects of reserve requirements on real variables such as output and the real exchange rate, 
see Reinhart and Reinhart (1997). 
15 When reserve requirements are remunerated, they are usually referred to as “liquidity requirements”. In addition, 
in a number of cases, liquidity requirements include not only funds deposited in the central bank but also liquid 
funds that can be managed by the banks and invested in certain category of liquid assets previously defined by the 
central bank.   
16 For further details on this episode, see Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1996).   15
practically only cash and bank deposits.
17 Let me explain. The prudential role of reserve 
requirements to provide international liquidity to the financial system can be undermined if there 
are substantial amounts of short-term paper (issued either by the private sector, the government 
or the central bank) that are not held on the balance sheet of banks. If a sudden loss of confidence 
in the financial system causes investors holding this paper to attempt to flee the market at the 
same time as deposit-holders are withdrawing their funds, international assets generated from 
placing reserve requirements on bank deposits may not be enough to cover the demand for 
international reserves generated by the combination of the sale of government or corporate short-
term paper and the withdrawal of bank deposits. 
18  
 
  The discussion above indicates that for reserve requirements to be effective as a 
prudential regulatory tool in dealing with capital flow volatility it is necessary that: (a) bank 
deposits account for most liquid assets in the economy, and (b) reserve requirements be invested 
in liquid foreign-denominated assets. Moreover, even if conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied, 
banks will have an incentive to avoid the requirements if they perceive that the requirements are 
excessive relative to the liquidity they would hold in the absence of the regulation. A well-known 
mechanism to avoid reserve requirements in developing countries has been the booking of 
domestic business in off-shore branches. In the 1990s, this was a common practice in Colombia, 
Costa Rica and Malaysia. Banks can also borrow and lend short-term funds in other markets, 
often called mesa de dinero in Latin America, that do not appear on their balance sheets and are, 
therefore, not subject to reserve requirements. 
 
  Conditions (a) and (b) above provide a simple, yet meaningful way to assess the potential 
effectiveness of current reserve requirements in developing countries. Consider first condition 
(a). Since reserve requirements are part of the monetary base, countries with high reserve 
requirements on bank deposits should display a low ratio of liquid financial assets to monetary 
base, unless non-deposit securities are a substantial component of liquid assets
19.  
 
  Chart 4a shows the ratio of liquid assets to monetary base against average reserve 
requirements for a sample of developing countries in early 2003.
20  The major finding derived 
from the Chart is that there is no straightforward relationship between the ratio of reserve 
requirements and the ratio of liquidity to base money. For example, in 2003, the ratio of liquidity 
to monetary base was the highest for countries with very different  
reserve requirements: Korea and Chile with low reserve requirements and Singapore and Brazil 
with very high reserve requirements. In these four countries, non-bank short-term securities, 
                                                 
17 This changed substantially in Argentina in the late 1990s when the government’ issue of domestic debt increased 
significantly providing an alternative source of liquidity. 
18 It could be argued that a flexible exchange rate system would avoid the problem of “insufficient foreign exchange 
reserves”.  However, if a sharp decline of confidence leads to a run on the financial system, a sharp depreciation of 
the exchange rate would have limited usefulness to contain the run as investors would be in search of foreign cash. 
Since a sharp depreciation of the currency cannot generate foreign funds “quickly enough”, the run would not be 
contained. 
19 The sample used in Charts 4a and 4b includes only those countries that keep traditional reserve requirements. It 
excludes countries that have move to the broader concept of liquidity requirements. To exemplify this, Mexico is 
shown as having zero reserve requirements. This country, however, maintains regulations regarding liquidity 
requirements.  
20 Data on reserve requirements for Latin America is taken from López Valdés and Jiménez (2003).  The rest is 
taken from the web pages of the corresponding Central Banks.   16
especially government paper, are important components of the domestic financial systems. In 
these countries, therefore, reserve requirements can have very limited capacity to contain the 
expansion of liquidity.  
 
Chart 4a. Liquidity to Base Money vs 























































  Turning to condition (b), even if bank deposits account for most liquid assets, reserve 
requirements can not provide protection against an unexpected reversal of capital inflow unless 
the funds generated by the requirements are, in fact, invested in international reserve assets. This 
condition is particular to developing countries and is a reflection of the high volatility of the real 
value of domestic financial assets discussed in Section II.  
 
Chart 4b plots the ratio of liquidity to international reserves against reserve requirements 
for a sample of developing countries. As shown in the chart, taken together the countries in the 
sample do not display an inverse relationship between the level of reserve requirements and the 
ratio of liquid assets to international reserves. While Peru 
   17
Chart 4b. Liquidity to International Reserves vs 



























































Sources: Web pages of respective Central Banks 
 
 
and South Africa conforms to the inverse relationship, the rest of the countries show no clear 
relationship between the two indicators. For example, Mexico (with zero reserve requirements) 
and Chile, India and Poland (with low reserve requirements) display a ratio of liquidity to 
international reserves similar to that of Singapore (with high reserve requirements). Moreover, 
Brazil, the country with the highest reserve requirements in the sample also has the highest ratio 
of liquidity to international reserves. This indicates that funds from the requirements have often 
not been invested in international reserves. 
 
  Thus, the analysis above raises caution about the effectiveness of reserve requirements as 
a prudential regulatory tool to face capital account volatility. While certainly there are some 
countries that satisfy both condition (a) and (b), these conditions seem not to be met by many 
developing countries. 
 
  Moreover, even if reserve requirements are effective in providing liquidity to banks when 
needed, this policy has an important drawback: it is applied equally to weak and strong banks. 
Because strong banks are better positioned than weak banks to maintain liquidity by ensuring 
that its borrowers remain liquid, the tax imposed by reserve requirements penalize strong banks 
harder than weak banks.   18
 
B.  Have Capital Adequacy Ratios been Effective in Dealing with Capital Flow 
Volatility? 
 
Capital requirements are an additional prudential tool to deal with the volatility of capital 
flows. The aim of this policy is to contain the expansion of excessive risk-taking by banks. This 
is done by requiring banks to comply with a risk-weighted capital to assets ratio determined by 
the regulators. At least at the conceptual level, riskier assets are assigned higher capital charges.  
  
  If capital requirements were, indeed, estimated to reflect the “true” risk features of banks’ 
portfolios and could be effectively enforced, this supervisory tool would indeed be a powerful 
mechanism to deal with capital flow volatility. Moreover, under those conditions capital 
standards would have two important advantages over reserve requirements. First, the problem of 
evasion inherent to a high reserve requirements policy would be avoided. Second, banks with 
riskier portfolios would be required to hold more capital than banks with sounder portfolios. 
Thus, the tool would allow supervisors to focus on weaker banks since capital ratios would 
decline in those banks that increase their risk-taking activities, hence providing an early-warning 
signal for supervisors. In a period of large capital inflows, this policy would limit the risk-taking 
of banks that intermediate the inflows.  
  
Encouraged by the perceived success of capital requirements as a supervisory tool in 
industrial countries, developing countries were advised to adopt similar rules for capital 
adequacy. Consequently, during the 1990s many developing countries directed their financial 
reform efforts towards implementing the recommendations of the Basel Accord on capital 
requirements. However, albeit with quite diverse outcomes, the recent experience of banking 
problems in developing countries, especially in emerging markets, indicates that capital 
requirements as suggested by industrial country standards often have not performed their 
expected role as an effective supervisory tool, as the accumulation of capital in banks’ balance 
sheets has not acted as a “buffer” to deal with unexpected adverse shocks to banks. 
 
  Recent evidence can be used to substantiate the statement above. Chart 5 shows growth 
rates of banking systems’ net equity during the year prior to the eruption of a major banking 
crisis. If equity capital were at all a good indicator of banking soundness (that is, insufficient or 
decreasing capital should be signaling banking weakness), banks in countries about to fall into 
major crisis should be facing difficulties in raising capital. This has indeed been the case prior to 
banking crises in industrial countries. As shown in Chart 5, during the year before the eruption of 
banking crises in Sweden, Norway and Japan, net real equity growth became negative. In 
contrast, at the eve of disastrous crisis episodes in developing countries, real net equity growth 
was not only positive, but also reached very high levels. Cases in point are Thailand, Mexico and 
Ecuador, where judging from the rapid accumulation of equity capital, this indicator did not 
serve well as a signal for major banking turbulence. 
 
  Further evidence that capital ratios have been largely meaningless in signaling banking 
problems in many developing countries is contained in Rojas-Suarez (2001). The main result of 
that study is that, among traditional indicators used by supervisors as early warning indicators of 
banking problems, the capital to asset ratio has performed the worst. For example, in Mexico, a   19
country that claimed to have adopted the capital standards recommendations of Basel just before 
the eruption of the 1994-95 banking crisis, the behavior of the risk-weighted-capital-to-asset 
ratio was useful in predicting problems accurately in only 7 percent of the banks that experienced 
severe crises. Indeed, according to the data provided by the Mexican Supervisory Authority, 
most banks in  
Mexico were in full compliance with capital requirements and held a ratio well above 8 percent!  
 
Chart 5. Real Net Equity Growth in
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The conclusion that can be derived from the above evidence is not that capital 
requirements can be of no use for supervisors in developing countries ever. As the discussion 
below demonstrates, the conclusion is that for the capital standards to be effective the standards 
need to take into account the specific risk features of developing countries. Just adopting 
standards that are based on the risk characteristics of industrial countries simply does not work.  
 
  Why haven’t capital adequacy ratios been effective prudential tools in developing 
countries? The reasons for the disappointing performance of this instrument can be broadly 
organized into two groups. The first group relates to the specific structural features of financial 
markets in developing countries, including those discussed in Section II as well as those related 
to the concentration of ownership of financial and real assets. The second group relates to the 
particular characteristics of the Basle capital standard, the standard chosen by most developing 
countries. It is argued here and elsewhere (see Rojas-Suarez (2001)) that implementation of the 
specific risk weights for different categories of assets contained in the Basel capital standard 
might exacerbate rather than reduce the vulnerabilities of domestic financial markets to capital 
flow volatility.  
 
  A clarification is needed here. The discussion in the rest of this paper mostly refers to the 
capital standard currently used by many developing countries; namely the 1988 Accord (Basel I). 
In June 2004, a new Accord (Basel II was finalized by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision for implementation beginning by the end of 2006 in some countries. While this 
paper does not deal with Basel II, it is important to point out that the large majority of 
conclusions reached here regarding the limited effectiveness of Basel I to control excessive risk-  20
taking activities by banks in developing countries, remain valid under Basel II. As will be 
discussed below, the explanations lie not only on the specifics of the regulation, but, most 
importantly, on the structural features of many developing economies. 
 
Let us now discuss the first set of reasons constraining the effectiveness of capital 
requirements. To determine the factors included in this first group, we raise the following 
question: Assuming that banks’ risks were appropriately estimated in the capital standards, what 
features in developing countries could prevent the standards from working properly?  As is well 
known, compliance with adequate accounting and regulatory frameworks is necessary to make 
the capital adequacy standard work. Inappropriate accounting standards and reporting systems 
and improper classification of non-performing loans stand out as the best examples of 
inadequacies reducing the effectiveness of capital requirements. In addition, a deficient judicial 
framework, that is unable to enforce supervisory actions when a bank’s performance is deemed 
faulty, seriously undermines the efficiency of bank ratios. Indeed, in spite of advances in reforms 
presented in chart 1, these factors are also behind the lack of investors’ confidence in the stability 
of domestic financial sectors discussed in Section II. 
 
  But if these inadequacies were the only factors preventing capital standards from 
working, concerns about the appropriateness of the capital standard for developing countries 
would be exaggerated. All that would be needed is an adequate prioritization and ordering of the 
principles stated in the Basel’s Committee’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. 
This, in fact, is often done in practice. A more fundamental problem with the capital standards, 
however, goes beyond the establishment of rules and regulations into a feature particular to 
developing countries, namely the lack of deep and liquid capital markets. This factor implies 
that, even when accounting, reporting and legal frameworks are adequate, capitalization ratios 
will be less effective if liquid markets for bank shares, subordinated debt, and other bank 
liabilities and assets are not available to validate the “real” value of bank capital (as distinct from 
its accounting value). Therefore, since these markets are typically either not available or not 
liquid in developing countries, changes in the market value of bank capital that provide 
supervisors in industrial countries information regarding the quality of reported capital are not an 
effective instrument in developing countries. 
 
        In contrast to industrial countries, asset ownership, both financial and real, is still highly 
concentrated in many developing countries, making the potential market for equity capital small 
and uncompetitive.  In such an environment, the intent of the capital standard—to increase the 
proportion of uninsured funding (equity and subordinated debt) to insured funding (deposits) in 
order to reduce bank stockholders’ incentive to take risks at the expense of existing public safety 
nets--can be easily subverted.
21 Shareholders’ wealth may not really be at risk when they supply 
equity capital to a bank because shareholders can finance their stake with a loan from a related 
party, which could even be a non-financial corporation and hence outside the regulators’ 
purview. Thus, concentration of wealth provides incentives for bank owners to supply low-
quality bank capital and, therefore, to undertake higher risks than bank shareholders in industrial 
countries would allow.  
 
                                                 
21 This point has been advanced by Rojas-Suarez and  Weisbrod (1997); and Rojas-Suarez, L. (2001)    21
  This suggests that it can be relatively easy for bank owners in several developing 
countries to raise large amounts of low-quality equity capital relative to the bank's capital base in 
a short time. Indeed, this feature may explain the results shown in Chart 5: the rapid growth of 
net "accounting" equity displayed at the eve of banking crises in several developing countries 
reflects the "low quality" of capital in these economies. Lacking a market that assesses the 
quality of bank capital, capitalization ratios cannot serve as an effective supervisory tool. 
 
Clearly, the severity of this problem varies widely across developing countries. For many 
countries, the constraints limiting the usefulness of capital requirements are extremely binding, 
and therefore beg the question: Is there an alternative to the use of capital standards for assessing 
the strengths of banks now, in the immediate future, when preconditions for the effectiveness of 
the capital standard are not in place? These questions will be dealt with Section IV. 
 
In some other countries, however, a continuous increase in the participation of foreign 
banks from industrial countries (as shown in Chart 2) is de facto reducing the degree of 
connected lending among financial institutions and between financial institutions and the real 
sector. Furthermore, in this (still small) group of countries, the accounting, regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks have improved drastically. Although there are very few developing 
countries with sufficiently deep and liquid capital markets,
22 the participation of foreign banks 
can provide an outside and independent source of capital in the pursuit of new wealth. The 
competition induced by the entry of new providers of wealth can indeed contribute to improving 
the usefulness of capitalization ratios.  
 
For this group of countries, the relevant question becomes whether adopting the 
internationally accepted capital standards recommended by the Basel Committee is appropriate 
(both the current Accord and the newly published Basel II). Indeed, to determine the second 
group of factors explaining the observed inefficacies of capital requirements, we ask the 
following question: Assuming that developing countries are structurally and institutionally 
“ready” to effectively implement capital standards, are the Basel Committee’s standards 
adequate for developing countries? To answer this question we first assess whether the 
classification of assets according to risk in the current Basel Accord “matches” risk features of 
bank assets in developing countries. Then, we quickly question whether a move towards Basel II 
could be the solution. 
 
The contention advanced in this paper and in Rojas-Suarez (2001) is that there is a poor 
matching between the assessments of risks contained in the current Accord recommendations 
and the actual risks in developing countries. Indeed, I argue that a straightforward application of 
the Basel I standard can actually weaken banking systems in developing markets as the standards 
create incentives for banks to increase the risk characteristics of their portfolios. I will now 
discuss two features of the standards that have contributed to weaken rather than strengthen 
banks’ balance sheets: the treatment of government claims held by banks and the treatment of 
inter-bank lending. 
 
                                                 
22 Chile, Hong Kong and Singapore may be the countries, among emerging markets, with the deepest financial 
sectors.   22
Regarding the treatment of bank credit to the government, under the current Basel 
Accord, loans to the public sector carry a 0% risk weight if the country belongs to the OECD and 
100% if the loan is to a non-OECD government. The idea, of course, is that claims on OECD 
governments can be considered “safe assets”. However, when applying the Basel 
recommendations to their domestic economies, most non-OECD countries attach a 0% risk 
weight to their own government paper. That is, banks in developing countries treat paper issued 
by their own governments as a “safe asset”, an assumption far from reality if one takes into 
account the default history of emerging market governments, highlighted by the recent defaults 
of Argentina, Russia and Ecuador
23. The problem with this practice is that by economizing on 
capital requirements, banks have a strong incentive to concentrate a significant portion of their 
asset holdings in government paper. This incentive not only gives a false impression of “bank 
safety,” but even more importantly, also contributes to weaken the “franchise value of banks,” 
which is rooted in their capacity to assess credit risk.  
  
While a thorough understanding of banks’ decisions to hold public vs private assets 
would require the specification of a complete model, it is fair to argue that the regulatory 
treatment of government paper has played an important role in banks’ decisions. Indeed, the 
increase of government paper as a share of total bank assets in many countries since the mid-
1990s, as depicted in Chart 3, coincides with the adoption of the Basel capital adequacy 
recommendations in developing countries. This regulatory incentive also has important 
consequences during recessions as banks tend to magnify the downward trend in economic 
activity by shifting their portfolio further away from credit to the private sector and towards 
government paper as they seek to reduce capital costs.   
 
The evidence above suggests that the regulatory treatment of banks’ claims on 
government tends to reduce the soundness of banking systems in developing countries.
24  This 
concern, as obvious as it may look, is, however, not taken into account when International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) assess country progress in strengthening financial systems. Indeed, 
developing countries attaching zero risk weight to domestic government liabilities will not 
receive a “warning signal” from IFIs even if the government is highly indebted as such a practice 
is not perceived as conflicting with the international standards!  
 
Regarding the treatment of inter-bank lending, the Basel Accord attach a risk-weight of 
100 percent to bank lending to non-OECD banks with a maturity of over a year, while lending to 
these group of banks with a maturity of a year or less carry a risk weight of only 20 percent. The 
obvious result has been a bias towards short-term cross-border lending towards developing 
countries banks. This, of course, exacerbates the volatility of flows to developing countries as 




                                                 
23 Argentina does not attach zero risk weight to government paper, but the risk weights still favor this kind of 
instrument. 
24 A counter case may be made by arguing that domestic government debt is safer than public external debt. 
However, given the long history of government-induced domestic defaults, either in the form of straight confiscation 
of deposits or sharp devaluations and inflations that drastically reduced the real value of government paper held by 
residents, I find this argument simply unconvincing. 
25 This effect has also been discussed in Reisen (2001) and Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001).   23
 
But problems for developing countries associated with the Basel Accord treatment of 
inter-bank lending go beyond increased volatility of capital flows as this regulatory provision 
also creates incentives to decrease the maturity of loans extended by domestic banks to the local 
economy.  The reason is that in their efforts to strengthen their banking systems, a number of 
developing countries have introduced regulations that reduce the maturity mismatch between 
banks’ assets and liabilities. The shorter the maturity of international loans to banks in 
developing countries, the shorter the marginal maturity of loans extended by banks in developing 
countries to their local customers in order to prevent a maturity mismatch between banks’ assets 
and liabilities. This, of course, adversely affects the vulnerability of economic activity to sources 
of funding.  
 
Thus, a lesson from capital standards as a prudential tool to deal with capital flow 
volatility is that even if adequate accounting, supervisory and judicial frameworks are in place, 
the current Basel Accord is not the appropriate capital standard for developing countries. One of 
its major shortcomings is that by incorrectly assessing the risk features of developing countries, 
it creates incentives for excessive risk taking by banks in these countries. 
 
Would implementation of Basel II help solve the problems outlined above? The “spirit of 
the recommendations”, namely, an attempt to align “regulatory” capital with the “true” risk of 
banks portfolios, would help, but not the actual prescriptions. It would take an entire paper to 
explain the statement I just made. For the purpose of this document, however, it is sufficient to 
point out that the only approach within Basel II that allows for an adequate measurement of risk 
is the “advanced internal rating-based approach” (the IRB approach). The problem, however, is 
that the large majority of banks and supervisors in developing countries are simply not ready to 
implement this approach. Unfortunately, the other two approaches available under Basel II for 
calculating minimum capital requirements create a whole set of new problems that would have 
undesirable consequences for the stability of the financial systems of developing countries. See 





IV. Prudential Regulations that Work in Developing Countries: How Should They 
Differ from Policies in Industrial Countries? 
    
 
A.  The degree of Financial Development Matters a Lot 
 
The discussion above leads to two central conclusions. The first is that, very often, the 
implementation of traditional prudential regulations to deal with capital account volatility in 
                                                                                                                                                             
26 The new Basel Accord aggravates this problem as the definition of short-term has been reduced from “one year 
maximum” to “three months maximum”. Further discussion of the problems for Latin American countries associated 
with the plausible implementation of the Basel II Accord is contained in Latin American Shadow Financial 
Regulatory Committee (2001). 
27 For example, a major issue in the so-called “standardized Approach” relates to the reliance on credit rating 
agencies for the determination of “risk weights” attached to loans in the calculation of minimum capital 
requirements.   24
developing countries has not delivered the desired results. The second is that the identification of 
factors explaining inadequacies in prudential regulation constitutes a major step forward for 
improving the design of policies so that they work in developing countries.    
 
With respect to necessary conditions for prudential regulations to work, section III showed 
the importance of the degree of financial development. For example, in industrial countries, 
where deep and liquid capital markets validate the value of accounting capital, capital ratios have 
proven useful. It is interesting to note that in those industrial countries with well-developed 
short-term non-deposits liquid instruments, such as the United States, reserve requirements have 
lost their effectiveness to a large extent, and are little utilized. Thus, the development of liquid 
capital markets tends to increase the effectiveness of capital ratios and simultaneously decrease 
that of reserve requirements. 
 
 In contrast, for the least developed countries in the world, wealth concentration and the 
resulting absence of competitive capital markets severely hinders the usefulness of any bank 
capital standard, not only the ones recommended by the Basel Committee. In this group of 
countries, reserve requirements could be potentially effective in dealing with capital account 
volatility. Unfortunately, inadequacies in reporting and supervisory systems are also the worst in 
this group of countries and these deficiencies provide fertile ground for evasion of reserve 
requirements. 
 
   In between these two extremes, the industrial countries and the least developed countries, 
there is a group of developing countries, where the participation of foreign banks has improved 
the functioning of the markets. Moreover, the accounting, reporting and supervisory frameworks 
have improved significantly. In these countries, mostly classified as emerging markets, some 
form of capital adequacy requirements could be an effective supervisory tool. But as Section III 
has argued, outright application of the Basel Accord (I or II) is not the right path to follow for 
strengthening their banking systems. 
 
. 
B. Prudential Policies that Work in Developing countries  
  
  In light of the experience discussed in section III, this section advances arguments 
supporting the need to develop regulatory and supervisory frameworks that better fit developing 
country needs. Because of the difficulties in obtaining desirable results from traditional 
regulatory policies, it is argued that policies that attempt to ” price developing countries’  risk 
right” may prove quite beneficial for strengthening financial sectors in these countries. As 
discussed above, the “pricing-risk-right” approach to regulation works by taking the particular 
financial features of countries into account in order to provide incentives for avoiding excessive 
risk-taking activities by financial institutions. In the case of industrial countries, the new Basel II 
proposal is based on this philosophy. The issue for developing countries is the identification of 
policies that would be able to provide the right incentives. 
 
Because the degree of development matters, policy recommendations for the least 
developed countries need to differ from the most financially advanced developing countries. 
Based on a simple classification of countries into two groups according to their degree of   25
financial development, the “pricing-risk-right” approach suggests that the following policy 
recommendations might be effective. The set of recommendations that follows is by not means 
complete or fully inclusive. They are simply examples of policies that are consistent with the 
objective of making prudential regulatory tools work. 
 
For the first group, the financially least developed group, where traditional regulations, 
such as reserve requirements and any capital standards are largely ineffective, it is obvious that 
sustainable policies consist in removing the constraints to the effectiveness of prudential 
regulations. That is: (a) the implementation of appropriate accounting, reporting and judicial 
frameworks, that would prevent the evasion of reserve requirements and (b) the development of 
markets that validate the accounting capital ratios.  
 
Those policy reforms, however, often take a significant amount of time to implement.
28  
In the transition to a more comprehensive reform, the “pricing-risk-right approach” suggests that 
it is still possible to identify and develop some indicators of banking problems that help to reveal 
the true riskiness of banks. For example, deposit markets have often been identified as markets 
that work in many developing countries in the sense that they have been able to provide effective 
early-warning signals about the relative strength of banks (See Rojas-Suarez 2001).  
Recommendations for policymakers in this set of countries, therefore, should focus on 
strengthening the role of market discipline. In other words, regulators should focus on 
developing tools that utilize information from markets that already work or that can be 
developed in a relatively short period of time. The central idea is that, if encouraged to do so, 
depositors and other holders of banks’ liabilities can discriminate between sound and weak banks 
by “pricing risks” adequately by, for example, charging higher interest rates on deposits or 
withdrawing deposits from financial institution perceived to be unsound.  
 
The key for market discipline to work, however, is the elimination of distortions that 
encourage bank liability holders not to discriminate among banks. A typical example that “kills” 
market discipline is a deposit insurance scheme that promises unlimited coverage to all 
depositors. It is important to stress that, as long as the institutions determining the effectiveness 
of prudential regulation remain weak, market discipline cannot work at its best. The 
recommendations that follow, therefore, can ease but not solve the problems associated with an 
inadequate regulatory framework. 
 
 With this in mind, specific recommendations that promote market discipline include: (a) 
encourage the public offering of uninsured certificates of deposits; (b) publish inter-bank bid and 
offer rates to improve the flow of information on bank quality; (c) develop “credit bureaus” that 
provide timely and relevant information about debtors creditworthiness; (d) encourage the 
process of financial internationalization--through promotion of foreign banking—as adequate 
market depth can only be achieved if a diverse group of investors and users of capital enter the 
market; that is, if the market becomes less concentrated; (e) strengthen regulatory efforts on 
improving deposit insurance schemes to credibly limit the insurance while ensuring that the 
scheme is sufficiently funded to finance the closing or selling of financial institutions in severe 
                                                 
28 Moreover, reducing concentration of financial and real assets could be a difficult task especially in countries 
where some political powers are “captive” to the agenda of economically powerful groups.   26
difficulties; and (f) avoid excessive bank access to central bank liquidity to contain moral hazard 
problems associated with the existence of a lender of last resort;. 
 
The last two recommendations (avoid generous deposit insurance and excessive access to 
central bank liquidity) can be credibly implemented in cases where “contagion” within the 
domestic financial system is limited. Very often, however, the failure of a large bank creates 
systemic problems that have led authorities to intervene in order to prevent the eruption of a 
major crisis. The policy recommendation from recognizing the existence of contagion is twofold. 
First, in order to avoid the eruption of systemic problems, improve the credibility of the safety 
net by establishing “prompt corrective actions” to minimize the expansion of incipient banking 
problems. Second, if in spite of preventive efforts, a systemic crisis nevertheless materializes, 
recognize that the solution of the problem should involve: (a) keeping the payments system alive, 
and (b) minimize the fiscal cost of banking crisis resolution.
29 
 
  Policy recommendation are quite different for the second group of developing countries, 
namely those with a sufficient degree of financial development to allow traditional prudential 
regulatory policies to be meaningful, but where their particular features such as limited access to 
international capital markets imply that strict application of industrial-country regulation, such as 
the Basel Accord, may be of limited effectiveness. In this group of countries, the 
recommendations advanced for less financially developed countries have to a large extent 
already been implemented. 
 
Following the “pricing-risk-right” approach, reserve requirements does not seem to be a 
desirable tool not only because it loses it effectiveness as alternative sources of liquidity develop 
in the domestic markets, but also because it does not discriminate between different levels of 
bank quality.  These arguments may explain Mexico’s decision to eliminate reserve requirements 
and the low ratios currently observed in Chile.  
 
Instead, the main recommendation for this group of countries is to design a transitional 
capital standard that appropriately reflects the risk of banks' assets because Basel (I or II) does 
not fit the bill in the short-run. This paper recommends that the standard should have two basic 
components. The first is the development of ex-ante risk-based regulations in loan-loss 
provisions. While this is widely recognized by the Basel Committee to be an essential 
complement to any capital standard, the proposal in this paper is one based on prioritization. 
Given the high frequency of adverse shocks in developing countries, especially the sudden 
reversal of capital inflows, the expected probability of occurrence of these adverse outcomes is 
very high compared to industrial countries. In this environment, provisioning takes a role, at 
times, more important than capitalization. Ex-ante risk-based provisioning would be a 




 The second characteristic is the establishment of a reduced number of risk categories to 
classify assets, with the central qualification that the categories of risk should reflect the 
                                                 
29 See Rojas-Suarez (2004). 
30 This point has been raised by Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) 
31 The use of ex-ante provisioning as an effective counter-cyclical prudential regulation tool is discussed in Ocampo 
(2003).   27
particular features of banks’ assets in developing countries. If loan-loss reserves are designed to 
reflect the expected losses in banks’ assets, minimum capital requirements need to reflect 
unexpected losses. Issues that need to be considered in the design of appropriate risk categories 
include an adequate risk assessment of government paper and the introduction of distinct capital 
charges for borrowers in the tradable and non-tradable sectors.
32  
 
The problems associated with attaching risk weights to government paper that severely 
understates the risk features of those assets have already been discussed throughout the paper. It 
is, however, important to stress that as long as governments do not make the political decision to 
correctly price the risk of their own liabilities, banks will have an incentive to discriminate 
against credit to the private sector relative to the public sector. Moreover, this inadequacy has an 
important adverse consequence for the effects of the volatility of capital flows: At times of 
increased uncertainties in the international capital markets, governments will have an incentive 
to turn to their domestic banking sector to place additional debt. While this will have the short-
term advantage of allowing governments to continue their fiscal plans, the policy increases the 
risk features of domestic bank portfolios and prevents market signals originating in the capital 
markets from inducing governments to undertake necessary fiscal adjustments. The recent crisis 
in Argentina is an excellent example of how banking systems can be weakened by the incorrect 
pricing of risk of government paper. While in the mid-1990s, the ratio of government paper held 
by banks was about 15 percent, this ratio had escalated to over 30 percent by 2001. Not 




 The need to distinguish risk features between tradable and non-tradable sectors when 
calculating capital requirement responds to the well-known fragility of the latter sector to 
adverse unexpected shocks, such as a sudden stop of international capital inflows. In developing 
countries, market risks—especially exchange rate risk—quickly translates into credit risk, 
especially for the non-tradable sector. While the need to distinguish risk characteristics between 
sectors can certainly help to strengthen domestic banking systems, the issues involved with this 
policy are quite complicated and cannot be resolved in this paper. The problem is that “pricing 
risk right” in this context could bring about a reduction in bank credit to small enterprises or to 
producers in the agriculture sector, from already depressed levels. Thus, the social problems 
created from this policy could be larger than its potential contribution to the stability of the 
financial system. The only conclusion that I will derive here is that the risk features of different 
sectors should not be ignored when designing capital standards, but that additional and 
complementary policies would need to be in place to prevent the elimination of sources of 
funding to enterprises in the non-tradable sector. 
 
Additional recommendations to allow these countries to deepen their financial systems 
and, hence, improve the effectiveness of accepted international prudential regulation include: (a) 
further enhancing the mechanisms of market discipline beyond the recommendations advanced 
                                                 
32 For a more comprehensive analysis of this proposal, see Rojas-Suarez (November, 2001). 
33 Some analysts have argued that the interference of the government in Argentina’s banking system, including the 
freezing of deposits, was the cause of the crises. Those measures, however, might have not been considered if bank 
assets were strong. With one third of banks’ asset invested in government paper of little value, the banks were in 
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for the least developed group of countries. An example is the use of the information in credit 
bureaus to estimate the probability distribution of loan losses an, therefore, to calculate adequate 
requirements for capital and provisioning (See Powell 2001);  and (b) deepening the process of 
financial internationalization through the increased participation of foreign institutional 
investors, especially pension funds and insurance companies.  
 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has shown that traditional prudential regulatory policies used in industrial 
countries have had limited effectiveness in controlling the adverse impacts of capital account 
volatility on financial systems in developing countries. The main reason for this disappointing 
result is that, by not taking into account the particular characteristics of financial markets in 
developing countries, these regulations cannot effectively control excessive risk taking by 
financial institutions. Moreover, the paper shows that contrary to policy intentions, some of these 
regulations, such as the Basel Accord on capital requirements, can exacerbate rather than 
decrease financial sector fragility, especially in episodes of sudden reversal of capital flows. 
 
 Important features that distinguish financial markets in developing countries from those 
in industrial countries include the predominance of assets with short maturity and high volatility 
as well as the large concentration of financial and real assets. These features significantly 
decrease the effectiveness of traditional prudential regulatory instruments. For example, reserve 
requirements cannot be effective in developing countries with abundance of short-term 
government paper because, in a highly volatile environment, holders of these instruments would 
tend to flee the markets at the same time as depositors are withdrawing their funds, rendering 
insufficient the amount of foreign exchange reserves--generated from placing reserve 
requirements on deposits--to meet the demand for foreign currency.  
 
Likewise, because assets in developing countries have different risk characteristics than 
assets in industrial countries, there is a poor matching between the assessments of risks contained 
in the current Basel recommendations implemented in developing countries and the actual risks 
faced by banks in these countries. This implies that a straightforward application of Basel I can 
actually weaken banking systems in developing markets as the standards create incentives for 
banks to increase the risk characteristics of their portfolios. The paper also points out that the 
implementation of the new Accord for minimum capital requirements (Basel II) is not the 
solution for developing countries at least in the short and medium-term. The “advanced” 
approach for the calculation of capital requirements is simply “out of limits” for developing 
countries. Ironically, the method that could be implemented by a number of developing 
countries, the “standardized approach” would open up a whole new set of problems with adverse 
consequences for the stability of developing countries financial systems.  
 
  The paper argues that the shortcomings of traditional prudential regulations can be 
overcome to a significant extent by following a “pricing risks right” approach to regulation, 
whose main feature is to encourage financial institutions to internalize the costs associated with 
the particular risks of the environment where they operate. In doing so, the approach attempts to 
provide incentives to avoid excessive risk-taking by financial institutions.   29
 
  The “pricing risk right” approach recognizes that developing countries are not a uniform 
group of countries and that, therefore, regulatory policy should not be uniformly implemented in 
all countries. The claim is that the degree of financial development matters and that policies 
should be implemented taking those differences into account. 
 
  By using a simple division of developing countries in two groups, the paper advances 
policy recommendations that are consistent with the “pricing risks right” approach. For the least 
developed group of countries, where concentration of financial and real assets is high and where 
basic accounting and judicial standards are inappropriate, the challenge is to identify and develop 
indicators of banking problems that reveal the true riskiness of banks. These indicators can be 
found, at least partially, in markets that already work such as the deposit markets. Specifically, 
recommendations for policymakers in this group of countries focus on strengthening the role of 
market discipline, while working on removing the inadequacies of traditional prudential 
regulations. Some of the recommendations include: encouraging the public offering of uninsured 
certificates of deposits and publishing inter-bank bid and offer rates to improve the flow of 
information of bank quality. Equally important is the need to encourage the process of financial 
internationalization as market depth can only be achieved if a diverse group of investors and 
users of capital allow the market to become less concentrated. 
 
For the second group of developing countries, the relatively more financially developed, the 
main recommendation is to design a capital standard that appropriately reflects the risk of banks' 
assets because Basel (I or II) does not fit the bill--at least in the immediate future. Among the 
policy recommendations advanced in this paper, there are two that stand out for their importance. 
The first is for governments to adequately assess the risk features of their own liabilities when 
calculating capital requirements. Not doing so increases the vulnerability of banks to shocks in 
the international capital markets and induces banks to crowd out loans to the private sector in 
favor of the government. The second crucial recommendation is the development of risk-based 
regulations in loan-loss provisioning. This would be a major deviation from current practices in 
the large majority of developing countries. 
 
In sum, traditional prudential regulatory policies cannot effectively contain the problems 
associated with capital flow volatility because they do not take adequate consideration of the 
particular risk features of financial sectors in developing countries. Hopefully, the day will come 
when the financial development gap among countries will be significantly reduced permitting the 
convergence of regulations throughout the world and, therefore, eliminating concerns about 
regulatory arbitrage. In the meantime, however, implementing policies that create incentives for 
financial institutions in developing countries to “price right” the risks inherent to the assets they 
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